Russian Men Tell BBC They Secretly Work for Ukraine's GUR Intelligence
Two men say they support Ukrainian military intelligence from inside Russia and from exile, but their claims about specific operations cannot be independently verified
By AXY War & Crime Desk ·
Key points
- Two Russian men say they secretly work for Ukraine's GUR military intelligence, and the GUR has confirmed that both are its agents.
- Ivan says he played a role from inside Russia in Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories.
- Foma says his network of undercover volunteers watches officers the GUR may target, and he admitted providing intelligence on Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, who was killed in Moscow last year.
- The men's specific operational claims cannot be independently verified, though Ukrainian authorities have acknowledged their drone strategy and use of secret agents.
- Under the laws of war, the lawfulness of such operations depends on whether they target military objectives, protect civilians and take feasible precautions.
Two Russian men who say they have been secretly working for Ukraine's intelligence services have given rare first-hand accounts of operations they claim targeted Russian military assets and personnel inside Russia. Their testimony appears in a BBC World Service documentary by independent Polish journalist Marcin Mamon, which examines the largely hidden world of Russian saboteurs working against the Kremlin. The BBC refers to the men as Ivan and Foma, names used to protect their identities. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate, known as the GUR, has confirmed that both men work for the agency. Beyond that confirmation, the specific operations the men describe cannot be independently checked.
In the documentary, Ivan says he played a role from inside Russia in Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories on Russian soil. Foma, who lives in exile in Poland, says he runs a network of undercover volunteers in Russia that watches high-level officers the GUR is considering targeting. He says the volunteers are never involved in the attacks themselves. Foma was tight-lipped about who his network was watching, but he later admitted that he had provided Ukrainian intelligence on Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, who was killed in Moscow last year by an explosive device hidden under his car.
Ivan's claimed role in drone strikes
Ivan's account concerns some of the most closely watched strikes of the war so far. Strategic bombers are large, long-range aircraft that Russia has used to launch cruise missiles at targets in Ukraine, and munitions factories produce the shells, missiles and explosives that armies depend on. If Ivan's account is accurate, it describes a model in which a person on the ground inside Russia supports strikes carried out with drones, which are unmanned aircraft that can be flown over long distances and used for surveillance or to deliver explosives.
The BBC describes Ivan's testimony as rare. Reporters have written about Russian sabotage groups before, but it is much less common to hear from someone who says he has operated on the ground and is willing to explain his activities in his own words. That rarity is part of what makes the documentary notable. It also explains why the claims are difficult to test. A first-hand account from a single source, even one who is identified by the broadcaster and whose employer has confirmed his role, is not the same as independent documentation of events.
Because Ivan's account is not supported by public records of the specific attacks he describes, readers should treat it as a claim rather than an established fact. The BBC has not been able to confirm the details of his activities, and nothing in the source material establishes the precise part he played in any strike.
Foma's surveillance network and the Sarvarov killing
Foreign-based Foma describes a structure that is different from Ivan's. Rather than carrying out attacks, his volunteers are said to observe senior officers. Foma says the GUR considers some of these officers as potential targets, and his network provides information about their movements and routines. He stresses that the volunteers do not take part in the attacks. That distinction matters both legally and morally, because surveillance can be part of a lawful military operation but can also be part of a chain that ends in violence against people who are not legitimate targets.
Foma's most significant admission concerns Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov. Sarvarov was killed in Moscow last year when an explosive device hidden under his car detonated, according to the documentary's reporting. Before that admission, Foma had declined to say who his network was observing. Once he acknowledged providing intelligence on Sarvarov, he tied his group to one of the most high-profile killings of a senior Russian officer in recent years. The BBC notes, however, that it cannot independently confirm what role Foma's information played in the killing, or whether it was used in the operation that took place.
The Sarvarov case shows why the testimony is so sensitive. A confession of this kind links a covert network to a death inside the Russian capital, which makes it both a matter of intelligence history and a potential criminal and political issue. Yet the same caution that surrounds Ivan's account applies here. The documentary can record what Foma says he did. It cannot, on its own, establish the full chain of decisions that led to the explosion.
What the GUR has and has not confirmed
The GUR has confirmed that Ivan and Foma both work for the agency. That is a significant official acknowledgement, because it places the two men inside Ukraine's military intelligence structure rather than leaving them as anonymous figures. However, the agency has also acknowledged that it cannot know the full picture of what its agents do. Intelligence services often operate through people they recruit, handle and pay, but they rarely have complete visibility over those people's actions, contacts or decisions.
That limitation was visible in the interview with Ivan's handler. When the handler was pressed on whether Ivan could be trusted, he replied: "I'm not sure of anyone, except myself." The remark reflects a basic reality of covert work. Agencies depend on sources they cannot fully supervise, and those sources can be mistaken, exaggerate their roles or act in ways their handlers do not know about. It also means that the GUR's confirmation of employment is not a confirmation of every claim the men make about their own operations.
Why the claims cannot be verified
Both the GUR and the two men are cautious about how much detail they share, which makes it impossible to verify the specific operations the men describe. Independent journalists do not have access to classified operational records, and people inside Russia who might corroborate events face serious personal risks if they speak publicly. Russian authorities control much of the information about security incidents and military losses, which further limits what outside reporters can confirm.
For these reasons, the documentary should be read as a documented account of what the men say, not as proof of what they did. Readers should keep that distinction in mind when weighing the accounts. The men's claims about their own roles remain unverified, while the broader tactics they describe stand on firmer ground. Ukrainian authorities have spoken openly about a strategy of coordinated drone attacks on what Kyiv says are legitimate targets inside Russia, and they have acknowledged using secret agents for this purpose.
Background: a covert contest inside Russia
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the war has since spread well beyond the front line. Long-range strikes, sabotage and intelligence operations have become part of the conflict, and both sides have accused each other of attacks behind the lines. Ukraine has used drones against targets inside Russia, including military bases, airfields and industrial sites, and Kyiv has described many of these as legitimate military targets. Russia has portrayed such attacks as unlawful. The men's testimony sits at the centre of this dispute because it describes Ukrainian agents working inside the country they are helping to attack.
Covert operations are a traditional part of state intelligence work, but they have become more visible in this war. Explosions, fires and assassinations inside Russia have drawn attention to the possibility that the conflict is being fought, in part, through networks of people on the ground. Russian security services have repeatedly warned about recruitment by foreign intelligence, and the men's accounts fit into that broader pattern of suspicion, recruitment and counter-intelligence. For readers, the key point is that these operations are often hard to see from outside, and official accounts from either side tend to serve political and military purposes.
International law: targets, civilians and agents
Under the laws of war, as set out in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between military objectives and civilians, and they must not direct attacks at civilians or civilian objects. Attacks must also be proportionate, meaning that expected civilian harm must not be excessive compared with the military advantage gained, and all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or minimise harm. This is often called the principle of distinction, and it is central to judging any operation.
Applied to the men's accounts, these rules raise several questions. Strikes on strategic bombers and munitions factories would generally be assessed as attacks on military objectives, but the legal judgment would depend on who was harmed, how the target was selected and what precautions were taken. Surveillance of military officers raises different issues. It can be a legitimate military activity when aimed at combatants, but it becomes a much more serious matter if it leads to attacks on people who are not lawful targets, or if civilians are placed at risk. The men's statement that their volunteers never take part in attacks is significant for this reason, although it is a claim that cannot be checked from the documentary alone.
The legal status of people who gather intelligence inside an enemy state is also complex. Espionage is not treated in the same way as direct participation in hostilities, and it is often prosecuted under domestic criminal law in the country where it takes place. Whether any particular action would amount to a war crime depends on specific facts that the BBC report does not establish. The documentary's material does not, by itself, show that a war crime was committed.
Stakes for Russia, Ukraine and ordinary people
For Russia, the accounts suggest that senior military and security figures may be vulnerable even inside their own capital. If such claims were confirmed, they could prompt changes in how Moscow protects officers and officials, including tighter vetting of staff, more restrictions on movement and greater scrutiny of vehicles and routines. Analysts often note that a state facing covert threats can respond by increasing internal surveillance, which can affect ordinary citizens as well as officials.
For Ukraine, covert networks can provide intelligence that conventional military means cannot easily obtain. That value comes with serious risks. People recruited for such work can face prison, torture or death if they are caught, and their governments may have limited ability to protect them once they are inside hostile territory. Handlers also face the problem of managing sources they cannot fully control, a point the handler's remark about trust illustrates.
Ordinary people in both countries may also feel the consequences. Attacks on factories, airfields or infrastructure can be followed by retaliation, stricter security measures or new restrictions on civilians. In Russia, citizens may face heightened suspicion, while in Ukraine, the population may face greater risk of counterattacks. Covert campaigns are difficult to judge from the outside because the information available is usually partial and shaped by the interests of those who provide it.
What to watch next
Several questions remain open. The GUR may face pressure to explain how it recruits, manages and vets agents who operate inside hostile territory, although intelligence agencies rarely disclose such details. Investigators and journalists may look for independent evidence about the Sarvarov killing and the other operations the men describe, but evidence of this kind is hard to obtain from inside Russia. Russian authorities may respond with their own account of the attacks and the people they say were responsible.
Analysts expect the documentary to add to debate over how far covert operations inside Russia should go, and whether the methods used by both sides are consistent with international humanitarian law. Any further official statements, court proceedings or independent investigations would be the most important sources of new information. Until such evidence appears, the men's accounts will remain a rare and significant set of claims that are important to understand but cannot yet be independently confirmed.
Questions and answers
Who are the Russian men speaking to the BBC?
The BBC calls them Ivan and Foma, names used to protect their identities. Both say they secretly work for Ukraine's military intelligence service, the GUR, and the agency has confirmed that both are its agents.
What do the men say they did?
Ivan says he played a role from inside Russia in Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories. Foma says he runs a network of undercover volunteers who watch high-level officers, and he admitted providing intelligence on Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, who was killed in Moscow last year.
Can the men's claims be verified?
Not independently. The GUR and the men are cautious about the detail they share, so the specific activities they describe cannot be checked. The broader tactics they describe have been acknowledged by Ukrainian authorities.
What happens next in this story?
Further official statements, independent investigations or legal questions about whether such operations comply with international humanitarian law could follow. The documentary is likely to add to that debate.
Topics: Ukraine intelligence, GUR, Russian saboteurs, Fanil Sarvarov, Russia-Ukraine war, BBC World Service documentary, covert operations
Sources: BBC World